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Abstract 
This study attempts to provide a theoretical and empirical analytical 
framework aimed at buttressing arguments according to which 
electoral democracy highly contributes to the improvement of the 
welfare of populations in countries where it is adopted as opposed 
to dictatorial regimes practiced up to date. 
This theoretical and empirical framework may permit to grasp the 
decisive factors which may transform elections into a powerful 
instrument more likely to lead governments or the people’s 
representatives to pay more attention to the aspirations of the 
disadvantaged, and to adopt policies able to enlarge the socio-
economic opportunities of the latter. 
The analysis of democratic processes in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
may highlight the fact that the conditions necessary for electoral 
democracy are far from being satisfied within this Sub-region, since 
elections are yet to become a powerful means for the populations of 
these countries to make their governments and elected officials 
accountable for their promesses and actions after they assume 
power. It is therefore important for all the national and 
international stakeholders participating in the fight against poverty 
to show more concern about those aspects which deprive the poor of 
their power to penalize elected officials through the ballot box, and 
which consequently favor the diversion by these officials of the 
funds intended to improve the social and economic welfare of their 
constituencies. 
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Introduction  
It was in the early 90’s that many African states, with the help of 
the eastern wind, committed themselves to a political 
democratization process at the same time that they were 
experiencing significant and chronic public finance deficits.  
Democratic governance was to become a condition for benefiting 
from development aid. Consequently, the leaders of developing 
countries and notably, those of African countries, embarked on a 
“race against the clock” to establish democratic institutions and to 
organize elections. In fact, it has been more than a decade since the 
democratic process has been in progress in Africa. However, most of 
the countries are as yet to witness any social or economic progress.  
According the UNDP (2003) through its world report on human 
development, the number of persons surviving in Sub-Saharan Africa 
on less than a dollar per day has increased, and income per head has 
declined in 20 countries or stagnated in many other countries during 
the 90’s in that part of the continent. 
Following these observations, many researchers, analysts, 
politicians, and civil society organisations have been attempting to 
investigate the link between democracy and economic and human 
development. Does democratic governance effectively constitute a 
necessary condition for African countries’ development as opposed 
to revolutionary governance models experienced by countries such 
as Burkina Faso in 1982, Chad in 1981, the Central African Republic 
in 1999, and the coup attempt in Cameroon in 1984? Those who 
answer this question in the affirmative are interested in knowing 
what the minimum necessary conditions would be in a democracy, 
for this type of governance to induce a virtuous cycle for economic 
and human development. 
However obvious they seem to be, these questions have yet to be 
subjected to in-depth analysis in the economic literature through a 
theoretical and empirical development of the link between 
democracy, good governance, and economic and human 
development. To achieve this objective, we choose as a framework 
of reference “electoral democracy”, which Quantin (1998) defines 
as a regime in which good governance and competition for the 
control of the government of a State is settled durably thanks to 
elections which must be considered as being free and transparent by 
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the main interest groups in order for them to conform to these 
elections rather than pursue the struggle for power by other means. 
The construction of a model of electoral democracy and poverty is 
possible only if the concept of “democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa” is 
considered in terms of its global functioning relative to the general 
logic (or standards) of democracy. After this introductory section, 
the paper is organized in the following manner: analysis of the 
electoral process in the SSA context in section 2; construction of the 
“electoral democracy- poverty reduction’’ model based on lessons 
drawn from the analysis of electoral processes in section 3; 
empirical analysis of the functioning of democracy in SSA based on 
the model in section 4, and lastly the conclusion in section 5. 
 
Electoral Democracy in Sub- Saharan Africa  
The interest shown in recent years by many African countries in the 
democratic process has notably led them to establish a large number 
of regulatory democratic institutions which necessarily brings up the 
issue of the cost of democracy incurred by states undergoing 
structural adjustment. In fact, in a context of economic 
liberalization and globalization, one may dread the risks or 
implications of the democratic process for countries which are 
already experiencing significant budget deficits. It therefore seems 
legitimate to ask whether or not any country has  economic interest 
to embark on democratization, given that the democratic process 
contributes significantly to weighing down state expenditures and 
ineluctably entails an increase in budgetary deficits. 
On the other hand, democracy leads to a better allocation of 
resources, since it permits the rationalization of public management 
and good governance, thanks to the actions of the countervailing 
powers of the democratic opposition and the sanction of voters 
through the ballot box, which should contribute to the development 
of African countries in the long run. 
Owing to this ambivalent nature of the democratic process, many 
authors such as Becker (1982), Alson (1965, 1982), Downs (1957), 
Alesina and Tabellin (1992), Alesina and Drazen (1991) have paid 
attention to the issues of electoral democracy, good governance and 
poverty.  Economists have therefore dwelt on the characteristics, 
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behaviours and electoral forms. The establishment of democracy in 
a country is concerned with public decisions, and this question 
constitutes one of the privileged themes of public choice theory, 
which according to Mueller (1989), is defined as ‘the economic 
analysis of non-market decision processes or more simply, the 
application of economic analysis to political science’.  Public choice 
theory, which was pioneered by Downs (1957), and Buchanan and 
Tullock (1962), finds applications in developing countries, mainly in 
the following four fields. 
• Voting theory, with studies devoted to autocratic regimes 
(Tullock, 1967, Wintrobe, 1989; Lafay, 1991) on the one hand, 
and the analysis of the links between the forms of political 
institutions and the rate of development (Pourgerami, 1988; 
Grier and Tullock, 1989), on the other hand. 
• The theory of interest groups derived from studies by Olson 
(1965, 1982), Becker (1982), and that of the “search for 
unearned or private income”, the foundations of which were 
postulated by Tullock (1967);  
• The domestic causes of foreign indebtness and the behavior of 
international suppliers of capital, analyzed by Alesina and 
Drazen (1991), Alesina and Tabellini (1992), and Lafay and 
Lecaillon (1993); 
• The theory of bureaucracy and the study of links between 
structural adjustment and political and economic interactions 
(Morisson, Lafay and Dessus, 1995). 
Derived from a political decision, the theory of democracy may be 
considered as a public good, given that a significant part of its 
financing is ensured by the state (Bernard, 1995; Percebois, 1991; 
Picard, 1995).  It even constitutes a collective good since it satisfies 
Lindahl’s three conditions (Wolfersperger, 1995; and Laffout, 1988), 
namely: 
• The impossibility of exclusion through prices, in the sense 
that democracy is not solely reserved for solvent citizens, 
except in cases where the voting system is based on tax 
quota. 
• The right of use, due to the fact that every citizen is entitled 
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to enjoy democracy. 
• The absence of the crowding out effect, since there is no 
rivalry between citizen-consumers (i.e. the fact that an 
individual enjoys democracy does not hamper others to do the 
same). 
In the literature on the electoral process in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 
elections are considered by many analysts as ‘elections unlike 
others’ because they are notably characterized by disrespect for 
electoral laws and dysfunctions that Quantin (1998) classifies into 
three categories, namely:  
• lack of discipline  
• difficulties involved in the organization for mobilizing 
supporters and  
• problems inherent in the production of representations and 
choices.  
In this respect, before proceeding to the analysis of electoral 
behavior in Sub-Sahara Africa, a number of authors - notably, 
Lasserre (2003) and Mhone (2003) - attempt to see whether these 
imperfections are characteristic or specific to this region. 
 
Electoral Imperfections and the Political Market in Sub-Sahara 
Africa 
In a recent synthesis, Zerbo (2005) has expounded the view that 
recent electoral experiences in developing countries and notably in 
Africa have highlighted gaps and dysfunctions, particularly as 
concerns the absence of an internalization of ‘good conduct’ 
standards, difficulties linked to the mobilization of supporters, and 
the prevalence of voting choices based on membership in an ethnic, 
religious or regional group.  However, it is useful to recall that these 
imperfections are also the permanent constituent elements of the 
most advanced democracies in the world.  None of the Western 
democratic experiences functions today without ambiguity, without 
undermining the standards of political loyalty, without some 
wavering in the mobilization of supporters, and without some 
interference linked to identification to certain groups, some 
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questions about which raises the individualism of the vote (Quantin, 
1998). 
Thus, one could argue that the electoral imperfections observed in 
Africa are not uniquely characteristic of this part of the world.  They 
may not strictly be considered as resulting from complex socio-
cultural relations that are developed by African entities.  These 
imperfections do not result from electoral competition similar to the 
competition that obtains in economic and financial markets.  
However, to entrust the designation of governments with an 
exchange procedure of the whole adult population leads to integrate 
in the operation, the characteristics usually implemented to settle 
non political exchanges, including those used in domestic life and in 
relations in the economy. 
Following the example of what is observed in the other sectors of 
social activities, Prevost, 2004; Redjenne, 2004; Zerbo, 2005; assert 
that the imposition of electoral discipline is, without end, subject to 
the pressure of opposing forces, which propose alternative ways 
such as fraud, populism, vote buying, as well as violence as efficient 
recourse for achieving objectives in the context of democratic 
procedure.  According to the same authors, populism, vote buying, 
and fraud do not constitute abnormal practices, but constituent 
elements of the political market. They are closely linked to 
competition. These types of imperfections are legion in economic 
and financial markets, both in the west and in African countries. 
However, imperfections in the political markets of SSA countries are 
not of the same order as those found in the Western political 
market.  This difference between the degree of imperfections in 
both political markets might not be more linked to the socio-cultural 
context than to the degree of mastery of the democratic game.  
Since Africa does not have a lot of experience in this matter, and 
since its adult population is not schooled, it is normal for 
imperfections such as populism, vote buying, and community votes 
to be more emphasized than in developed countries. 
It follows that electoral imperfections might not be barriers to the 
establishment of electoral democracy, as the electoral history of 
developed countries has shown (Lafay, 1993).  They might not be 
specific to the African continent, but are rather constituent 
Page 10 
elements of the political market, and are linked to the competition 
imposed by the democratic game (Percebois, 1991).  For this reason, 
the development of the theoretical foundations of the relationship 
between electoral democracy, good governance, and human 
development could be justified through the strategic behaviours of 
candidates and voters in order to be able to build a model.  Thus the 
section below dwells on electoral analysis and the strategic 
developments of candidates and voters, with a view to formalize 
and specify the model. 
 
Electoral Strategies of Candidates: Parliamentary Elections in 
Cameroon and Burkina Faso 
Considering the experience of old democracies, the number of votes 
tends to rise with the level of democracy (Niskanen, 1971). 
According to analysts, in studying the candidates’ strategies, it 
would be pertinent to distinguish candidates by whether or not they 
are in the opposition or in office, insofar as the position of political 
parties relative to the party in power is decisive in electoral 
strategies implemented in the conquest of public opinion. 
For instance, legislative elections permit us to grasp the strategic 
behaviours of parties in power and those of opposition parties.  We 
analyze, in the first place, the parliamentary elections of Cameroon 
in July 1995 and those of Burkina Faso in May 1997, which would 
permit to determine the strategic behavior of ruling parties, and in 
the second place, the parliamentary elections of Cameron in July 
2002 and those of Burkina Faso in May 2002, which could show the 
behavior of opposition parties. 
Similarly, the Cameroon parliamentary elections of July 1995 and 
those  of Burkina- Faso of May 1997 resulted in the large victories of 
the ruling parties which respectively won 119 out of 180 and 100 out 
of 111 parliamentary seats in both countries. According to Niskanen 
(1968, 1971) and Loada (1998), three factors might explain the 
victories of theses parties, namely, the organization of these 
parties, their endowments in human and material resources, as well 
as their innovative capacity. 
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Organization of Ruling Parties 
As concerns the organization of the party in power (or presidential 
parties), the opposition is usually weakened, notably, by its internal 
divisions, and the incumbent party was enhanced in 1995 and in 
1997, respectively in Cameroon and in Burkina Faso by the rallying 
of several opposition militants, and it merges with other political 
formations to create a base resting on a common new ideology 
which may, for instance, be social democracy.  In Cameroon, the 
Rassemblement democratique du people camerounais (RDPC), and in 
Burkina Faso, the Congres pour la Democratie et le Progrès (CDP) 
effected real political and administrative cross-ruling of the national 
territory, relying on the structures of the former one-party system 
(in Cameroon), and the former popular structures put in place by 
the revolutionary government (in Burkina Faso), on the chieftaincies 
and the Lamida. These structures permitted the RDPC and the CDP 
to gain the political and ideological support of the populations.  
 
Human and Material Resources 
With respect to human and material resources, democracy may be 
considered as a public good, since a significant share of its financing 
is ensured by the state (Bernard, 1985; Percebois, 1991; Picard, 
1995).  The membership of the incumbent party (in Cameroon as in 
Burkina Faso) includes most of the administrative, economic, and 
social elites of the country, notably the youngest elites who entered 
the political scene following the rotation of elites (which occurred in 
1983 with the advent of the revolution in Burkina Faso), or their 
admission to the party (after the transfer of power in Cameroon in 
1982).  Thus, given its power position, the party in power has no 
problem in acquiring the material resources necessary to carry out 
its electoral campaign and to use its power over the electoral 
process. Some candidates belonging to the party in power and 
having at their disposal all the information provided by the state, or 
being able to exert a significant influence on the spatial allocation 
of the state’s capital expenditures, will claim their paternity or 
their merit, and hence multiply the number of official inaugurations 
or start-ups of public works, just before the period preceding 
election day.  To this may be added populist handouts of financial 
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resources or foodstuffs to certain classes of the population. 
 
Innovative Capacity 
Considering innovative capacity, Zerbo (2005) asserts that to 
nominate its candidates to legislative elections (during the 
parliamentary elections of July 1995 in Cameroon and of May 1997 in 
Burkina Faso), the party in power, contrary to opposition parties, 
organizes primaries in order to get rid of certain politicians believed 
to be well-seated in their electoral constituencies, and to select the 
most representative candidates so as to maximize their chances of 
winning. 
Thus, it emerges from these examples from Cameroon and Burkina 
Faso that parties in power, thanks to their appropriation of the 
state’s machinery, and their power positions, implement strategies 
ranging from party enhancement or the weakening of the opposition, 
to the enrolment of most of administrative economic and social 
elites, not to mention populist methods.  Confronted with such 
strategies, opposition parties adopt defensive attitudes, and 
criticize and point to the poor performance of democratic 
institutions without which political alternation is unlikely, instead of 
convincing, increasing the awareness of, and mobilizing the voters. 
Contrary to the Cameroon experience where opposition parties 
obtained a decreasing percentage of parliamentary seats, i.e. 48 % 
and 16 %, respectively during the 1997 and 2002 parliamentary 
elections, the ruling party in Burkina Faso won the elections by a 
landslide.  In the aftermath of this poor performance by Burkina 
Faso’s opposition parties, the parties adopted structures which 
allowed them to obtain 48 % of the seats during the 2002 
parliamentary elections.  This highly significant opposition parties’ 
progress may be explained by the qualitative change of the political 
environment in Burkina-Faso between 1998 and 2002, which is 
characterized by the proportional technique used for the attribution 
of seats, and above all, by a greater involvement of the opposition 
in the democratic game during the last elections.  The situation is 
quite different in Cameroon where political parties are less 
involved.  Contrary to the 1997 elections, which were more or less 
boycotted by opposition parties, the parliamentary elections of 2002 
Page 13 
in Burkina Faso were characterized not only by a wider participation 
by opposition parties in the electoral process, but they also 
emphasized their collaboration with the electoral regulatory 
organizations, with the media, and by achieving better organization 
of their own parties. 
In Cameroon, opposition parties are yet to adopt a common strategy 
during important elections.  They have acquired the habit of 
boycotting elections, whereas Burkina Faso’s opposition parties, 
which used to boycott elections, seem to have understood that the 
electoral process remains the most efficient means for achieving 
alternation in government, and that their participation in this 
process is crucial in advancing democracy, both at the institutional 
level and at the level of increasing the awareness of voters, as well 
as mobilizing them.  This is why in 2004, all political parties 
committed themselves to participate in parliamentary elections.  
Moreover, they sent their representatives to the Commission 
Electorale Nationale Independante (CENI) and, in the context of 
these elections, they also agreed to collaborate with the Conseil 
Superieur de l’Information (CSI), which is in charge of ensuring that 
the principle of equal time is respected in the State’s media 
programs.  This attitude partially explains the performances realized 
by political parties.  It notably contributed, in the case of Burkina 
Faso, to the improvement of regulatory bodies such as the CSI (Ki-
Zerbo, 2002). 
By accepting to participate in the 2002 parliamentary elections, 
Cameroon’s opposition parties consequently organized themselves in 
accordance with their material (quite modest) and human resources.  
Certain opposition parties with less representation over the national 
territory, and aware of their weakness, proceeded to form alliances 
or coalitions.  Moreover, to maximize their likelihood of winning, 
some of these parties and coalitions abandoned their traditional 
methods of choosing their candidates, to henceforth let the rank-
and-file designate the most representative candidates. 
Similarly, opposition candidates during electoral campaigns opted to 
go to the voters door to door, rather than use usual populist 
strategies, given their limited financial and material means.  These 
candidates not only organized meetings in larger urban centres, but 
they also made great efforts to come close to the voters in order to 
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heighten the awareness of the populations about the power of the 
ballot.  Opposition candidates whose parties are represented in the 
government do not hesitate to use the logistical means of their 
ministries during electoral campaigns in Cameroon as in Burkina 
Faso. 
 
Despite material and organizational problems, opposition parties in 
Africa in general and SSA countries in particular, are participating 
more in regulatory electoral institutions, and collaborating more, 
mainly with private information agencies, with a view to achieving 
better operation of the democratic process likely to ensure political 
alternation. 
 
Electoral Attitudes of Voters in Sub-Sahara Africa 
It should be noted that in electoral competition, the voter 
constitutes the most precious element to conquer.  S/he finds 
himself/herself facing many candidates to chose from, and this 
choice depends on considerations such as membership in an ethnic 
group, and region - as is the case in Cameroon (Menthong, 1998);  
the advice of a spiritual chief as among the Mourides in Senegal 
(Monjib, 1998); populist relationships, the level of well-being, or 
ideologies. 
 
Votes Based on Ethnic, Regional, and Religious Membership 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, most voters are inclined to choose those 
candidates who belong to their particular ethnic, regional or 
religious group.  For instance, during the presidential elections of 
1992, 1998 and 2004 in Cameroon, Paul Biya obtained about 97 
percent of the votes in the south province, where he has his origins, 
and 40 percent of the votes expressed on the national level.  His 
potential rival during this period, John Fru Ndi, obtained in his 
region of origin (NorthWest) 87 percent of the votes, and 36 percent 
of the votes nationwide.  In Senegal, as in Northern Cameroon, the 
spiritual leader’s opinion constitutes a significant factor influencing 
the choice of the voter (Akin to the Islamic (or Mouride) vote in 
Senegal).  According to the results of a survey conducted by the 
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Political Science Department of the University of Saint-Louis 
(Senegal) in 1998, 42 percent of the Mourides cast their ballots by 
affiliation to their religious brotherhood or ethnic group (Monjib, 
1998).  But this ethnic and regional manner of voting is becoming 
less significant in some SSA countries, notably in countries such as 
Mali, Benin, and Burkina Faso, where the parliamentary elections of 
1997 and 2002 have shown that the candidates are increasingly 
finding a lot of difficulties in imposing themselves in their loyal 
constituencies due, notably, to the efforts made by many non 
governmental organizations (NGO), which work to increase the 
literacy, awareness and training of the voters, particularly those 
residing in rural areas, by encouraging them to become responsible 
for their decisions and their actions.  Besides the vote based on 
ethnic, regional or religious considerations, a second type of vote is 
based on populism or the convictions of candidates.  
 
Votes Based on Populism or the Convictions of Candidates 
According to a study conducted in Benin by Banegas (1998), the 
responsibility of the elected representative is conceived in terms of 
populist redistribution as a matter of priority.  The responsible 
elected representative is the one who redistributes.  The best 
candidates are those who redistribute financial, material resources 
or foodstuffs. As noted by Banegas (1998), populist redistribution 
does not suffice to ensure the legitimacy of the candidate or to win 
the adhesion of voters in this new pluralistic context which favors 
‘’free riding’’.  Zerbo (2005) argues that a fundamental distinction 
is made between the fact of benefiting from the generous gifts of 
candidates during elections and the profound convictions of the 
latter.  Thus the populist practices of candidates do not alone 
determine the vote.  The voters should nevertheless take into 
account the likely effects of the choice of candidates on their future 
lives, notably on their welfare.  The persistence of economic 
difficulties and the continued deterioration of the living conditions 
of populations in SSA countries during the last decade, combined 
with the effects of learning from past electoral experiences, could 
explain the increased demands by voters for a better knowledge of 
the candidates’ deep convictions, as well as their capacity to 
manage public affairs in the interest of the people, and to guarantee 
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better living conditions for the whole population, despite the 
permanent effect of mobilizing the financial resources necessary for 
the management of democracy. 
In a recent study by UNDP ( 2004), support to electoral systems and 
processes is linked to the realization of the Millennium Development 
Goads (MDG’s) as follows: Firstly, through programs of civic 
education and voter information, which permit the broadening of 
democratic participation, notably as concerns men and the other 
under- represented segments of society.  Secondly, by reducing the 
costs of electoral processes which weigh down national budgets, and 
in terms of the proportion of the contributions of donors, it is 
possible to save some resources in favor of direct poverty programs 
of reduction programs.  Thirdly, by enhancing the independence and 
capacity of institutions responsible for the organization of elections, 
the probability for contesting the results of elections may be 
reduced so as to achieve more peaceful transitions and alternations 
in power.  Enhanced security and stability directly contribute to the 
establishment of greater stability in the lives of the poor at the 
economic level, and permit the saving of more resources for the 
provision of services, even during elections or following elections.  
Progress achieved in the realization of MDGs moreover permits the 
creation of an environment conducive to better governance. 
To this end, we could distinguish between three types of voters: 
those whose vote is a function of its consequences on future well-
being; those who vote is based on populism; and those whose vote 
depends on membership in a group or on ideology. The economic 
analysis of democracy thus leads to the construction of a model, 
which considers the fact that the vote of electors as a function of its 
effects on future welfare relative to outgoing candidates, depends 
above all on the progress or regression of the level of economic, 
social, and human development. 
 
Electoral Democracy and Poverty Reduction: Conceptual and 
Methodological Framework 
This section attempts to discuss the theoretical foundations of the 
link between democracy and the fight against poverty.  This has to 
do with using the elements retained in the preceding analysis, then 
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to build a general model and to specify and adapt it for application 
to the context of Sub-Saharan Africa.  These two methodological 
elements are successively presented below. 
 
General Model of Electoral Democracy and the Fight against 
Poverty 
The model “Electoral Democracy and the Fight against Poverty” is 
being based on a function called “the function of democratic 
sanction of the government by the people”.  This function has the 
advantage of depending on the level of welfare represented here by 
the incidence and the depth of multidimensional poverty, as well as 
the factors highlighted in the preceding analyses (vote as a function 
of its consequences on future welfare), in addition to the fact it 
gives the percentage of electors who might vote against 
governments for various reasons. 
Two types of votes are distinguished: The votes in favor of the party 
in power, and the vote against the party in power.  We also consider 
three types of voters who are: 
a. Poor voters who vote against governments owing to their living 
conditions, as opposed to the poor who vote for the government 
because of populism or ethnic, regional or religious membership. 
b. Non-poor voters who vote against governments for the cause of 
the most disadvantaged.  Their opposite are the most well-off voters 
who vote for the governments for personal interests and the 
interests of their social class.  
c.  Voters who vote against governments simply for divergences in 
ideologies, religions or ethnic considerations.  
 
 The Function of Democratic Sanction of the Government 
Let  = the number of voters in a given population; 
 and = the incidence and depth of multidimensional poverty, 
respectively;  
N
0P 1P
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= the proportion of the poor who vote against governments 
because of their living conditions; 
 = the proportion of the non poor who vote against governments 
for the cause of the poor and,  
 = the proportion of voters who decide to sanction governments 
for ideological reasons or ethnic, regional or religious membership. 
 (Parameters , , and w vary between 0 and 1). 
Remark: The more living conditions deteriorate, the higher the 
percentage of the votes of the poor penalizing the party in power 
will be.  An increase in poverty is perceived by the population as 
proof of the incapacity of the government to manage public affairs 
to everybody’s advantage. 
For this reason, parameters g and ß are increasing functions of the 
incidence index , and of , the index of multidimensional 
poverty.  
Let   and ; 
We will suppose that these two parameters are functions of  and 
, and, they take on the value 0 in , which means 
that when nobody is poor in society, the share of sanction votes for 
poverty reasons is equal to . According to these notations, the 
number of poor voters who vote against governments because their 
living conditions are poor is given by the following relation (1): 
                                                                                                      
 
 The number of non-poor voters who vote against governments 
because of the poor conditions under which certain strata of the 
population live, is given by the following relation (2):  
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The number of voters who vote against governments for ideological, 
populist, and social considerations is simply equal to their proportion 
 multiplied by the rest of voters after subtracting the preceding 
two categories of voters. 
                                                    
 
Therefore, the cumulative number of sanction votes against 
governments is given by relation (4). 
  
    
 By dividing relation (4) by the total number of voters , we obtain 
the sanction function (Fsg), which gives the percent of sanction votes 
against governments (see relation (5) below): 
                                                            
  
    By simplifying (factoring) the second member of relation (5), we 
obtain the simplified expression of the sanction function against the 
government given by relation (6) below, which highlights a partition 
of voters into two groups.   The first part of the second member of 
relation (6) corresponds to the voters’ sanction votes against 
governments linked to the Poor’s living conditions, while the second 
term corresponds to sanction votes linked to the political weight of 
the opposition. 
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The forms or characteristics of the functions  and 
 are specific to each community, or each country. 
The function , which measures the proportion of the poor 
who vote against the government is characterized by the level of 
schooling and the mastery of the democratic game by the poor on 
the one hand, and by the degree of tolerance, patience, and the 
demands of the poor for the improvement in their welfare, on the 
other hand.   Moreover, the lower the level of schooling and 
awareness of poor voters are, the easier it is to convince them 
through populist electoral strategies, and through arguments related 
to their membership in some group they identify with, despite the 
fact that they remain poor. 
The function gives the proportion of sanction votes by the 
non poor against the government due to the existence of poverty, 
which is characterized by the degree of solidarity or conflicts of 
interest between social classes within the population, as well as the 
level of patience, or the demands of the most well-off relative to 
the improvement expected in the standard of living of the poor.  
Parameter w of the sanction function captures the influence or 
ideological, religious or ethnic, and populist weight of all opposition 
parties in a country.  The weaker the opposition, the lower w will 
be. 
 
Programme of the Incumbents to Stay in Power 
In order for governments to stay in power, they have to minimize 
sanction votes against them.  We take into account the 
characteristics of functions  and  , as well as 
parameter  as short and medium term exogenous data, and the 
government programme to minimize sanction votes against their 
party is given by the following minimization programme :   
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By using the expression of the sanction function in program (7), we 
obtain program (8). 
                                                         
  
                                            
Under the hypotheses formulated above on functions and
, it appears that the solution of program (8) would be
, with .   This means that to reduce the 
percentage of sanction votes against the government party to the 
lowest level possible, the exogenous factors being fixed, 
governments must eradicate poverty.  In this case, the percentage 
of sanction votes is reduced to the ideological, populist or ethno-
regional weight of the opposition. 
However, according to electoral democracy principles “to have the 
majority” is not equivalent to “having the support of all the voters 
or even 70 percent of the voters”; but it is also “having a little more 
than half of the voters” (i.e. 50.5, 51, 51.5, or 52 etc.)”.  In this 
view, we may deduce the solution of programme (8) such that, if the 
weight w of the opposition is close to 50 percent, that is, in an 
equilibrium situation in terms of weight or legitimacy between the 
party in power and the opposition, the elected representatives are 
obliged to continue combating poverty until it is eradicated, 
otherwise they will lose power. 
Likewise, when the functioning of democratic institutions and the 
characteristics of the voters are such that the values of the 
functions of the parameters g and ß are close to 1 even for low 
poverty indicators, governments are forced to adopt policies likely 
to enlarge the economic a social opportunities in favour of the most 
disadvantaged. 
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On the other hand, if the weight of the opposition is low or 
negligible, that is, well below 50 percent or even close to 0 percent; 
or if voter social characteristics and the functioning of democratic 
institutions are such that the parameters and  remain close to 
0 even for high-valued poverty indicators; elections will not 
constitute a powerful means for the populations to put pressure 
insofar as the leaders are not obliged to eradicate poverty in order 
to gain the majority vote in elections. 
To illustrate, let’s assume that  =20 percent.   Therefore, Fsg = 
(0, 0) = 20 percent of the votes; in other words, if poverty is 
eliminated, the percentage of the voters for the ruling party is 80 
percent.  Yet, eradication of poverty requires, among other things, 
more effort, material, financial, and human resources.  Rationally, 
taking into account the huge costs involved, and owing to the fact 
that resources are scarce, governments may set their electoral 
objective at, for instance, 60 percent of the votes- i.e. at less than 
the 80 percent representing the score they would receive when they 
would eradicate poverty.  To the electoral objective of 60 percent 
set by governments corresponds a value of 40 percent for the 
sanction function.  Given the fact that this function reaches its 
minimal value at (0,0), it follows that the governments’ electoral 
objective at 60 percent of the votes would correspond to a couple of 
values (P0g, Pjg) of the incidence and depth of poverty, which is  
different from (0,0).  In this case, the electoral objective of those in 
power does not converges toward the poverty eradication objective.  
According to the exogenous factors characterizing the function g (.) 
and  (.), indicators (Pog, P1g) corresponding to the electoral 
objective of those elected are more or less far from (0, 0), which 
represents a situation without poverty.  In a dictatorial regime, the 
parameters g and  are equal to zero. 
The sanction function of the general model is a function yielding the 
probability to overthrow the regime.  Given that the population 
cannot express itself in a dictatorial environment, this probability 
depends on the relative weight of the members of the opposition, 
who usually are forced to work outside the law or in secret.  Thus, 
the main concern of dictatorial regimes is to reduce the opposition 
w
g β
w
β
β
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to nothing.  Likewise, in a regime that considers itself democratic 
where, however, democratic institutions malfunction, and where 
civil liberties and political freedom are subject to severe 
restrictions, the parameters g and  are totally null.  Nothing 
guarantees that the improvement of the living conditions of 
populations constitutes one of the concerns of those in power.  
Thus, it is rather the reduction of the coefficient w of the sanction 
function to its lowest level possible which turns out to be the 
principal objective of such a regime.  Again in this case, although 
legal, the opposition is permanently destabilized.  Its leaders are 
kept locked up, and usually forced to go into exile by the leaders of 
the ruling party. 
According to the general model, democracy is a necessary condition 
for the convergence of the objectives of those in power towards the 
human development objectives of populations.  To this end, 
democracy would be a process that evolves slowly with the passing 
years of democratic experiences.  But one may pose the question as 
to which minimum conditions in a democratic country would be 
necessary for this model of governance to ensure the convergence of 
the elected’s objectives towards the development objectives of 
populations?  To answer this question, we will proceed to the 
specification of the model. 
 
Specified Model of Electoral Democracy and the Fight against 
Poverty 
The specification of functions with parameters g and  is sufficient 
for the general model to be adapted to the Sub-Saharan African 
context.  This means that by using the results of the preceding 
analyses, we propose specifications of relations (9) and (10), 
respectively for parameters and  of the sanction 
function:  
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With  ≥ 0, b ≥0 and 0≤ ≤ 1                                                     
Where  = coefficient of naivety or inexperience of poor voters in 
the electoral processes; for a given level of poverty, the higher  
is, the more it is easy to convince poor voters through populist 
methods, vote buying, arguments based on ethnic or regional 
membership. Thus, the percentage of sanction votes among the poor 
linked to their living conditions declines.  
When the coefficient  tends toward infinity, the percentage of 
the sanction votes of the poor tends toward 0 owing to their living 
conditions. 
 is the coefficient of tolerance, patience or demands of poor 
voters put to those in power relative to their living conditions. 
For a given depth of poverty, the higher is, that is, the more poor 
voters are patient or less demanding of an improvement in their 
living conditions. 
When tends toward infinity, the percentage of these sanction 
votes tends toward 0. 
 is a constant which takes into account the other factors not 
explicitly taken into account in the model, such as the independence 
of the regulatory institutions of the voters and their capacity to limit 
electoral frauds.  A value of  close to 0 indicates a weak 
independence and a low capacity for democratic institutions to 
ensure the transparency and regularity of elections.  On the other 
hand a value of  close to 1 indicates that democratic institutions 
are both strongly independent and capable of ensuring that elections 
will be transparent and free in the areas where the poor reside. 
 
Moreover, it must be recognized that when the incidence and 
intensity of poverty increase, the proportion of sanction votes linked 
to living conditions increases among the poor. 
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Relation (10) gives a specified form of the proportion of the non-
poor who would vote against the ruling party for reasons linked to 
the populations’ living conditions. 
                                                                                                       
 
With ≥ 0,  ≥0 and 0≤ ≤ 1 
Where  is the coefficient of conflicts of interest between the 
most well-off and the poor.  A value of  close to 0 indicates a 
strong solidarity between social classes. On the other hand, a value 
of  tending to infinity indicates serious conflicts of interest 
between the rich and the poor.  The proportion of the non-poor 
voting against the leaders to support the poor becomes a decreasing 
function of coefficient .  
is the coefficient of tolerance, or patience of non poor voters 
toward those in power relative to improvement in the Poor’s living 
conditions.  For a given level of the depth of poverty, the higher d 
is, i.e. the more the non poor voters are patient as concerns the 
improvement of the living conditions of the poor, the lower 
percentage of their sanction votes is.  When the non-poor show 
unlimited patience, i.e. when  tends to infinity, the percentage 
of their sanction votes tends toward 0 because of the poor living 
conditions of the poor. 
 is a constant which takes into account the other factors not 
explicitly taken into account in the model, such as the independence 
of regulatory institutions and their capacity to reduce electoral 
frauds.  These factors may be different depending on whether we 
are talking about the poor voters or the richer voters, since the 
latter master relatively better, the mechanisms of the democratic 
process. 
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In relations (9) and (10), parameters and  may be assimilated 
to scores which account for the efficiency with which the country’s 
democratic institutions function, as well as their capacity to ensure 
that elections are free and transparent. Thus, the specified sanction 
function is given by relation (11) below. 
              
                                        
From relation (11), several types of situations can be analyzed 
according to the dominant factors that exist in the country or 
community.  Thus, on the basis of the hypotheses posited on the 
parameters, several situations will be analyzed with the 
understanding that the factors ‘weight of the opposition’ was 
analyzed in the preceding section to see to what extent the couple 
of poverty indicators corresponding to the electoral 
objective chosen by the government would converge toward the 
objective , which is the objective of poverty eradication in 
democratic states where the weight of the opposition is weak. 
When elections are not free and transparent in a country because 
democratic institutions do not function correctly, the parameters k1 
and k2 are closer to 0.  In this case, the electoral objective 
of those in power is farther from . When democratic 
institutions depend totally on those in power or when these 
institutions do not exist or malfunction, k1 and k2 are equal to 0.  
Thus, the reduction or the fight against poverty ceases to be a 
concern for the party in power.  The priority of the latter is to 
destroy the opposition; for if  and are equal to 0, the sanction 
function depends only on the weight of the opposition.  This likely 
explains the behaviour of certain non democratic regimes which 
have ruled or continue to rule in Africa. 
 
In a context where elections are free and transparent, and where 
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the opposition is weak, for the electoral objective  of those 
in power to converge toward the objective   to improve the 
welfare of the populations, the parameters , , and must 
tend respectively to 0.  This means that the poor are experienced or 
master relatively well the mechanisms of the electoral process; that 
a greater solidarity exists between the social strata; and that voters 
are demanding or do not reveal to those in power their great 
patience concerning an improvement in the conditions of their 
existence.  Elected representatives would therefore be obliged to 
work continuously for an improvement in the welfare of the 
populations in order to eradicate poverty, insofar as doing so is the 
only way to obtain the majority of the votes in a population of 
voters who are increasingly cunning, demanding, and who feel a 
greater sense of solidarity with one another.  With this in mind, the 
political objective of the party in power converges toward the 
welfare objective, notably in favour of the poor.  The ruse and 
solidarity of the voters constitute powerful assets which may serve 
to put permanent pressure on those in power who are thus 
compelled to reduce poverty in order benefit from voter patience, 
which depends notably on the progress already achieved in terms of 
improvements in living conditions, and to reduce the incidence and 
depth of poverty in order for the impacts on the latter in the 
sanction function to be lessened. 
However, when the degree of poor voters’ naivety is significant or 
when serious conflicts of interest exist between the most well-off 
and the poor, or again when the voters show boundless patience and 
are not demanding relative improvements in their living conditions, 
the sanction function takes on low values or those close to 0, even 
when poverty indexes are high.  In this case, nothing ensures the 
convergence of the ruling party’s political objective toward the 
welfare objective . 
According to this model, the factors which determine whether the 
priority electoral objectives of the party in power will converge 
toward, (or diverge from) the welfare objectives of the poor are the 
following: the mastery of democratic politics by the populations, 
solidarity among the people or low levels of conflicts between social 
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classes, as well as sustained demands by the populations for 
improvements in their welfare, in addition, of course, to the 
conditions necessary for the regularity and transparence of 
elections.  Divergence from the welfare objective of the poor simply 
means that most or some of the above factors do not obtain. 
In the light of this model’s theoretical conclusions, its application to 
the case of SSA countries will permit to capture their weaknesses 
relative to the convergence of the objectives of the policy makers 
and those of the people.   
 
Analysis of the Situation of Electoral Democracies in Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
This section attempts to analyze, for Sub-Saharan African countries, 
the conditions which ensure the convergence of the electoral 
objectives of elected representatives toward the welfare objective 
of the population highlighted in the model.  The purpose here is to 
grasp the situation of electoral democracies relative to the decisive 
factors which make elections a powerful means for compelling 
elected representatives to become more attentive to the needs of 
the most disadvantaged. 
 
Estimation of the Sanction Function 
After specifying the preceding model in equation (11), we turn to 
data drawn from the report of the Obsevatoire National des 
Elections au Cameroun (ONEL), and from a group of University 
researchers who carried out a simulation using the results of the 
1995 parliamentary elections.  The simulation results provide us with 
the parameters and variables applicable to our model, and they 
permit the estimation of the sanction function we specified.  This 
information has been completed by the synthesis of data obtained 
from the headquarters of opposition parties with seats in the 
National of Assembly of Cameroon, and the works of Fambon (2003) 
on election financing and political parties in Africa.  The estimate of 
the sanction function is the following: 
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Emerging from this estimation (equation 12) are a certain number of 
observations: Firstly, the proportion g of the poor who voted during 
the elections against the party in power because of their living 
conditions is estimated to be 60 percent.  The proportion of the non-
poor voting against the party in power for the cause of  the poor is 
30 percent, and lastly, the proportion of voters which decided to 
sanction the party power because of ideological and ethno- religious 
reasons is 70 percent.  The parameters  = 0.7,  = 0.9,  =  
= 0.9, and  = 0.95.  This means that the objectives of those in 
power is far from converging toward the welfare objective (0, 0) of 
the populations whatever the values of (P0, P1).  Moreover, the 
parameters k1 = k2 = 0.05 indicate the quality of democratic 
institutions and electoral methods.  In addition, these parameters 
show the degree of naivety of poor voters, solidarity or conflicts of 
interest between the rich and the poor strata. 
According to the assumptions made on the parameters and the 
variables P0 and P1, the estimate of the sanction function (equation 
12) permits us to grasp the situation of electoral democracies 
relative to the decisive factors which render elections an effective 
tool likely to compel elected representatives to pay attention to the 
needs of the poorest voters, namely, the weight of the opposition, 
the factor of solidarity or of conflicts of interest been social strata, 
the level of mastery of the democratic game by voters.  The analysis 
is simultaneously extended to some other countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
 
Weight of the Opposition and Functioning of Democratic 
Institutions 
The model highlights information according to which the 
opposition’s political weight is a decisive factor in the percentage of 
the sanction votes cast by populations against the government in 
Cameroon.  A strong opposition supposes quite representative 
opposition parties covering the national territory, which are well-
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organized, more united, and increasingly present on the political 
scene. 
 
In Cameroon, as in most central African countries (notably, Gabon, 
Chad), and even in West Africa (Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal), 
opposition parties are politically weak, even negligible.  They are 
yet to be able to ensure the traditional political functions of 
mobilization, canalization (of the people), and representation of 
various interests. In Cameroon, some parties have disappeared 
between two elections (e.g. Mouvement Populaire pour la 
Revolution, Le Parti des Fourmis etc.), whereas the ruling RDPC 
behaves like it used to during the one-party system period.  The 
parameters = 0.7, = 0.95,  = = 0.9 tend to 1 and  thereby 
indicate that the (P0, P1) objective of the leaders of the RDPC do not 
converge toward the welfare objective of the populations.  
Poor voters are not experienced, and do not grasp the mechanisms 
of the electoral process very well, or are excluded from the process 
by various techniques which they ignore. Moreover, the couple of 
indicators (P0, P1) which is the electoral objective set those in 
power do not converge toward .  This situation does not bode 
well for eradicating or at least alleviating poverty.  The elected 
representatives are at no time compelled to work constantly to 
improve the welfare of the most underprivileged. 
The divergences between and within opposition parties, as well as 
the multitude of existing parties in Cameroon, as in most Sub-
Saharan African (SSA) countries, brought about or not by the parties 
in power (which may be thought as a ‘State-parties’ in which the 
party and the State merge), constitute some of the factors 
contributing to the political weakening of the Opposition. 
In Cameroon, in less than three years between 2001 and 2004, the 
three most important parties in the country’s political scene 
(notably, the SDF, UNDP and UPC) witnessed internal crisis which 
caused the defection of some of their first or second leaders, and 
some influential members of the parties, and even many rank-and-
filers. The same thing happened in Burkina Faso between 2002 and 
2004, and recently in Chad between 2006 and 2007.  Moreover, in 
e a b c
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the case of Cameroon, which has about 20 million inhabitants, 
twenty or so parties were numbered as having participated in the 
2002 parliamentary elections.  In Burkina Faso, nearly 40 or so 
parties in a population of 12 million inhabitants took part in the 
2002 legislative elections in that country. 
Furthermore, aware of the advantages or spoils and the nepotism 
the ruling party benefit from, politicians in SSA countries change 
‘hats’ to join the party which wins the elections (Ekomi, 2002); 
which, as a consequence, dampens the political fervour of the voters 
who henceforth lose interest in politics, thus leading to the low 
turnout at elections as witnessed in some SSA countries. 
Besides these problems and internal difficulties, political parties in 
SSA countries are victims of destabilizing techniques.  Influential 
leaders are often threatened, locked up or forced to go into exile by 
governments which have total control over the judiciary and security 
forces.  The parameters  =  = 0.05 tend to 0, indicating that 
the elections are neither free not transparent.  The value of 0.05 
also indicates that democratic institutions totally depend on those in 
power.   Since the 1992 elections in Cameroon, it has been observed 
that a party member figuring in the list of RDPC (the party in 
power), will certainly be elected to the tune of 98 % of the vote.  
But once elected, this representative will not be accountable to the 
populations who elected him.  This situation strongly indicates that 
poverty reduction or the fight against it ceases therefore to be a 
concern for those in power.  Thus, the opposition is usually 
weakened further by the undemocratic methods to which the parties 
in power resort in the context of the competition imposed by the 
political system. 
In some SSA countries, this situation is further favoured by the 
absence of a balanced governmental system based on the separation 
of the powers of the State, and the non- existence of a well-
educated, well-organised, and active civil society able to make the 
elected representative accountable for their actions.   In these 
countries generally, the institutional fabric is embryonic, the 
separation of the powers non-existent, and the regulatory bodies put 
in place to run the electoral process are totally under the control of 
State- parties in power. 
1k 2k
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All these factors indicate and confirm the values taken on by the 
parameters e, b, a, and c of the sanction function of the 
representatives elected by the populations in Cameroon.  As a 
consequence, they reduce the people’s electoral power which is the 
only means that can be used to put pressure on those in power so 
they can adopt the policies likely to create social economic and 
social opportunities.  Thus, the present challenge for Cameroon, as 
for most SSA countries, could be to put in place a system of 
representation with political parties, and groups for the defense of 
the interests of the people which are operational, a system of 
government based on the separation of powers, as well as an active 
civil society able to control the actions of those power, to propose 
different methods for increasing participation in the democratic 
game, and to favour alternation in power. 
 
Solidarity or Conflicts of Interest between the Rich and the Poor? 
In most Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, the most well-to-do 
generally show a sense of solidarity with the poor, owing to their 
duties and obligations vis-à-vis their community.  In fact, the 
material and financial burden of the well-off increases with the rise 
in poverty in the community.  In the Littoral Province in Cameroon, 
for instance, which numbers 3 millions inhabitants, there were 
fifteen political parties which participated in the parliamentary 
elections of 2002, and as we mentioned above, 40 parties or so took 
part in parliamentary elections of Burkina Faso in May 2002.  The 
annual agricultural deficits in Cameroon, Gabon, Burkina Faso, and 
Senegal are characterized by appeals from salaried employees, 
employers, and self-employed workers of the urban sector on behalf 
of their families or rural sector communities, for assistance in 
purchasing foodstuffs (FAO, 2006). 
Generally, when the population is very vulnerable, and work 
opportunities and other activities become increasingly scarce, or 
when formal education and health centres are more and more 
inaccessible, the well-off are further called upon by the poor of 
their community for help.  A more pronounced monetary poverty 
entails a strong pressure on the budgets of the rich in their 
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community due to the support they must provide to the most 
underprivileged for survival.  Moreover, the work opportunities are 
limited; the number of ‘brothers and sisters’ of ‘male and female 
cousins’, of ‘nieces and nephews’ and of ‘aunts and uncles’ waiting 
for employment to come by, and living in the households of the 
well-off, increase.  When the modern health centres are more and 
more inaccessible to the members of the community, and the latter 
become increasingly poor and sick, they move to the city where 
there are health centres and benefit from the help of their well-off 
relatives to get well. Finally, the illiteracy of the members of the 
community also constitutes a determining factor which affects the 
welfare of the well-to-do, insofar as it limits access by the poor 
(already a burden to their richer relatives) to health services, the 
labour market, credit, and so forth. 
Whether poverty is monetary or non-monetary, it has negative direct 
and indirect impacts on the welfare of the non-poor in the 
communities of SSA countries.  The non-poor generally support the 
poor, notably demanding the adoption of pro-poor policies to ensure 
better living conditions for the poor.  The non-poor would therefore 
be more disposed to vote against the leaders who neglect the plight 
of the poor, rather than vote for these types of leaders.  In the 
estimation of the sanction function for Cameroon, the coefficient (
= 0.95), which measures the boundless patience of the voters, 
i.e. the fact that voters are not demanding enough on the issue of 
improvements in their living conditions, and the fact that there are 
less conflicts of interest between the rich and the poor, is very 
significant above all in the northern part of the country where 
begging for charity prevails. 
Aware of the existence of solidarity between the rich and the poor 
whose electoral effects outweigh those of eventual conflicts of 
interest, of past, present or future failures, the elites in power have 
often amplified the social divide between the rich and poor, and 
other social strata.   They have regularly used the ethnic sentiment 
as an instrument to keep and legitimize themselves in power ‘while 
denying the official argument central to their political rhetoric fully 
devoted to the apologetics of development and national unity’ 
Otayek, 1999).   It is increasingly becoming frequent in sub-Saharan 
Africa to question the citizenship, the exercise of civil rights, and 
a
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the political capacity of some voters or candidates, starting from the 
supposed origin of their parents (Bayart, 2001).  These various 
identity claims cannot be considered as the perverse effects of 
pluralism, and even less of democracy.  They stem mainly from the 
practices which the holders of power make of ethnic or religions 
differences in the context of their strategies with a view to conquer 
power. 
 
Mastery of the Democratic Game and Access to Information by 
Voters 
The populations of SSA countries are limited as concerns the 
mechanisms, the mastery of the concepts, and the content of the 
electoral process, owing to their low level of education, difficulties 
of access to information, and to the fact that Africa does not have a 
large experience of multi-partyism. 
According to PNUD (2004), 40 percent of the adult populations in SSA 
countries are illiterate as against 0 percent for developed countries, 
and 27 percent for all developing countries.  In Cameroon 49.2 
percent of the population remains illiterate with about 65.3 percent 
concentrated in the rural area.  This proportion stands at 76 percent 
in Burkina Faso, and a significant part of the population is yet to 
have access to such traditional means of information as a radio or a 
television.   Moreover, on the African continent, numerous are those 
electoral experiments which have been boycotted by opposition 
parties or badly organized, so that the populations have not yet 
learned enough or learned nothing at all from the former elections. 
The preceding estimates of sanction function are quite significant. 
The coefficients  =  = 0.05 indicate the fact that the 
democratic game engages populations which grasp neither the 
concepts, content, mechanisms, nor the process.  Moreover, there 
are a lot of voters in Cameroon who are not able to carry out a 
pertinent analysis of the programmes and speeches of the political 
candidates, as well as to distinguish between the populist actions of 
the latter, and those actions which really aim to improve their 
welfare in the long-term.  The naivety coefficient  = 0.7 of the 
sanction function is relatively high in Cameroon.  Also illiteracy and 
1k 0k
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limited access to information contribute to render populations less 
demanding of improvement in their living conditions.  This acts to 
increase the coefficients = 0.9 and =0.9 of tolerance vis-à-vis 
those in power as regards living conditions.  Consequently, the 
power of the populations to compel those in power to be attentive 
to the most underprivileged is thus reduced.  This situation prevails 
in most of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The above foregoing, information plays an important role in the 
understanding of the democratic game by voters and their 
mobilization, especially if information is considered from the 
standpoint of its educational, training function, in addition to the 
fact it increases voter awareness.  Unfortunately, in addition to the 
material and financial problems which constitute a serious 
constraint in the development project, the instruments of 
communication and information, the independence of the media, 
the freedom of expression, association, and information remain 
subjected to significant restrictions in SSA countries. 
Nowadays, with the proliferation of local and rural radio stations in 
many SSA countries, the popularization of new information 
technologies (NIT), which are difficult to control by those in power 
and tend to adopt actions to heighten the awareness of the public 
(sometimes broadcasting in local languages); and the general wave 
towards the setting up non governmental organizations, populations 
increasingly have access to information.  This relative accessibility 
to information by the population has led to the injection of more 
transparency into electoral processes, as in certain West African 
States such as Benin, Ghana and Mali, during their recent 
presidential elections. 
On examining the estimation results of our model and the situation 
in the countries of the African continent relative to the necessary 
conditions which make the electoral democratic process a tool likely 
to help poor populations make those in power accountable, it 
emerges from the study that, at the present stage of 
democratization in sub-Saharan Africa, elections do not yet 
constitute the powerful tool hoped for by the poor population to 
compel the parties in power to pay attention to their votes and their 
needs.  Despite the advances recorded on this matter in the 
b d
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continent, it may be said that they are still far from being 
significant.  Consequently, it is necessary and opportune that all 
political  actors, interest defence groups for the populations, civil 
society, NGOs and the state, all work together to ensure the 
efficient functioning of democratic institutions, increase the 
awareness, mobilize, and train the populations on the concepts, 
content, mechanisms, and processes of the democratic game, 
including the fundamental freedoms such as the freedom of 
expression, of association, and of information, with a view to 
provide the individuals with the means to compel the governments 
to adopt the policies capable of enlarging economic and social 
opportunities. 
 
Conclusion 
 This study has attempted to construct a theoretical and empirical 
framework based on the idea according to which good governance 
strongly contributes to the improvement of the welfare of 
populations in countries where it is implemented, unlike dictatorial 
systems.  With this approach, it is possible to grasp the determining 
factors which render elections the powerful means they are to 
compel the party in power or the elected local representatives to be 
attentive to the needs of the poor, and to adopt policies likely to 
broaden social and economic opportunities.  It also emerges as 
concerns the conditions necessary to guarantee free elections, as 
well as civil and political freedom, that balanced political weight or 
influence between the party in power and the opposition; a good 
mastery or comprehension of the democratic game by the voters; 
solidarity or low degree of conflicts of interest between social 
strata; as well as demands for increasingly better living conditions 
particularly for the poor; are decisive factors for the convergence of 
the electoral objectives of those in power toward the welfare 
objective to which the poor aspire.  Relative to these decisive 
factors, some progress has been achieved here and there in sub-
Saharan Africa.  But, the study shows that a satisfactory level is far 
from being attained for some of these decisive factors throughout 
this part of the continent. 
 
Page 37 
To that end, elections still are not a powerful means for the 
population to compel the governments to be more attentive to the 
aspirations of the poor.  Hence the need for the national and 
international stakeholders, cooperation agencies, financial backers 
etc, in the context of the fight against poverty, to be concerned 
about those aspects which deprive the poor of their power to 
sanction the elected representative through the ballot box, thus 
favouring the poor management and the diversion of the funds 
allocated to socio-economic development. 
However, the realization of the optimum implies, for African 
countries engaged in the democratization process, substantial 
progress in this area, since their democratic institutions function 
poorly.  This leads us to conclude that the realisation of the 
democratic optimum is subject to the affirmation of real political 
will. 
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